Osservare le startup per capire la concorrenza tra partiti

Osservare le startup per capire la concorrenza tra partiti


L'ondata populista della destra radicale in Europa è solo l'ultimo esempio di partiti “sfidanti” che rubano la scena ai partiti tradizionali. Nel loro Political Entrepreneurs. The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe (Princeton University Press) Catherine De Vries (Bocconi) e Sara Hobolt (London School of Economics and Political Science) tracciano un'analogia con la concorrenza di mercato spiegata da Joseph Schumpeter e sostengono che il cambiamento politico riguarda tanto la capacità dei partiti “sfidanti” di innovare quanto l'incapacità dei partiti tradizionali di rispondere. I partiti “sfidanti” impiegano due tipi di innovazione per rompere il dominio consolidato dei partiti: mobilitano nuove questioni, come l'immigrazione, l'ambiente e l'euroscetticismo, e impiegano la retorica anti-establishment per minare il fascino dei partiti principali. Privi di esperienza di governo, i partiti “sfidanti” si adattano più rapidamente ai gusti mutevoli degli elettori e sfruttano il loro disincanto. Bocconi Knowledge, per gentile concessione degli autori e dell'editore, pubblica un estratto del libro.
European politics is undergoing a transformation. The traditional political parties of the center that used to dominate elections are struggling to remain relevant. They are being forced to confront the fact that continuing to play by the old rules may no longer work. Meanwhile, agile political entrepreneurs are defying traditional ways of doing politics by setting their own rules. They are able to adapt faster to shifting voter tastes and successfully challenge the status quo that favors their dominant competitors. Like start-up firms, many challenger parties are destined to fail. The key question is when and why some break through and what are the consequences of their success. And, of equal importance, what can dominant parties do to face off political entrepreneurs that challenge their market power?
Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that we currently find ourselves in the eye of the storm. Being in uncertain times makes it difficult to distinguish the short-term ripple effects of an unexpected election result from a political sea change that affects the overall direction of the currents guiding the political system. While there is no doubt that election outcomes in Europe have become more volatile and political fragmentation is on the rise, we suggest that there are some key patterns in the kind of changes we observe. These patterns may be somewhat blurred around the edges and sometimes subject to temporal or country-level idiosyncrasies, yet they are important signposts for understanding the essence of the political transformation that we are experiencing and what the future might hold. In this book, we have presented a long view of the developments in West European politics from the post-war period until today. We have shown that these developments are as much about the resilience of dominant parties as they are about the rise of challenger parties. Our objective has been to contribute to the understanding of both resilience and change, of both challenger and dominant parties, and how the tug-of-war between them transforms European politics.
Who are the dominant parties, and how are they able to face off challengers? Who are the challenger parties and which strategies have allowed them to successfully defy the market power of dominant parties? And what are the consequences of the rise of challenger parties for the stability of European democracy? By building on the literature of industrial organization in economics, we have developed a theory of political change that focuses on the interplay between the market power of the dominant mainstream parties and the disruptive innovation of challenger parties. The notion of dominant market players and disruptive political entrepreneurs is familiar in the study of industry, where dominant companies appear to be unbreakable until innovation comes along. Kodak dominated film until digital technology destroyed its market power. Nokia was unbreakable in mobile devices until smartphones emerged. The dominant forces of computing in the 1990s, Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, and Dell, were challenged by the disruptive innovators of Google, Apple, Amazon, and Facebook, which have become the new goliaths. Change in industry might occur faster than in party politics, but in this book we have argued there are important parallels between the two.
Dominant parties have long been able to maintain their dominance in most of Western Europe by employing strategies aimed at protecting their market power—namely, distinctive convergence, issue avoidance, and competence mobilization. Recently, however, they have been less successful in doing so as the ties between parties and voters have weakened. This has created opportunities for challenger parties to disrupt the political system through two types of innovation. First, challenger parties acting as issue entrepreneurs offer policy innovations by mobilizing new political issues. Second, challengers employ antiestablishment rhetoric to prevent dominant parties from imitating their innovation and to challenge the dominant “brands.” By focusing on the strategies of both dominance and innovation, we can explain why European party systems have remained so stable for decades, but also why they are now increasingly under strain.

Ascolta Catherine De Vries e Sara Hobolt, ospiti del podcast Clarity in a Messy World: “Does the Pandemic Spell the End of Populism?”

di Catherine De Vries e Sara Hobolt
Bocconi Knowledge newsletter


  • Uno sguardo multidisciplinare al diritto delle societa' quotate

    Un nuovo volume curato da Marco Ventoruzzo pensato per operatori, manager e studenti  

  • Oltre i bonus: iniziative sociali e motivazione dei dipendenti

    L'IGIER visiting student Nicolas Sourisseau racconta un seminario con Oriana Bandiera (London School of Economics)  


  Marzo 2023  
Lun Mar Mer Gio Ven Sab Dom
    1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31    


  • A Quest for Knowledge


    Alberto Alesina seminar Room, 5-e4-sr04

  • Rebecca Dizon-Ross - Mechanism design for personalized policy: A field experiment incentivizing behavior change

    REBECCA DIZON ROSS - Chicago Booth School of Business

    Alberto Alesina Seminar Room 5.e4.sr04, floor 5, Via Roentgen 1